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CHALLENGES OF POVERTY AND ISLAM
FACING AMERICAN TRADE LAW
RAJ BHALA"
AN EXERCISE IN TEMPORIZING
Was Doha a Success?
This article is all about questioning the conventional wisdom
on a recent and seminal event in international trade law.' The
Rice Distinguished Professor, The University of Kansas School of Law.
www.law.ku.edu. A.B. 1984 Duke; M.Sc. 1985 LSE; M.Sc. 1986 Oxford; J.D. 1989
Harvard. Marshall Scholar 1984-86. Member, Royal Society for Asian Affairs and
Council on Foreign Relations.
In December 2001, I was privileged to present an earlier draft while in Dhaka,
Bangladesh at the Independent University and the International University. I thank the
Vice Chancellors of each, Professor M. Alimullah Miyan, and Dr. Bazlul Mobin
Chowdhury, respectively, and their fine colleagues and students, for their many
thoughtful comments.
In both Dhaka and Washington, D.C., I was honored to discuss trade issues with senior
Bangladesh officials, including H.E. Amir Khosrn M. Chowdhury, Minister of Commerce,
and the Honorable A. Tariq Karim, Ambassador to the United States. They deepened my
appreciation for developing country perspectives. I hope this article assists them in their
work.
Finally, I am grateful to Mr. Mohammed Zakirul Hafez, Esq., and Mr. Michael P. Daly,
Research and Symposium Editor, St. John's Journal of Legal Commentary, for their
support.
All WTO documents cited herein are available on the WTO's website, www.wto.org.
Unless otherwise noted, throughout I use the term "developing country" to encompass
both "developing country" and "least developed country," which is a distinction made in
international trade law. Without implying a pejorative implication, or the correctness of
one development path, I also use commonly understood equivalent terms - "poor country,"
.underdeveloped country," and "Third World country."
I For an earlier, abridged, two-part version of the article, see Raj Bhala, The Third
World, the Muslim World, and the New Trade Round (Part One), 8 INT'L TRADE LAW &
REGULATION 118-27 (2002) and The Third World, The Muslim World, and the New Trade
Round (Part Two), 8 INT'L TRADE LAW & REGULATION 145-53 (2002). For an earlier,
expanded, single version that includes a discussion of textile and apparel trade between
Pakistan and the United States, and between Bangladesh and the United States, see Raj
Bhala, Poverty, Islam, and Doha: Unimet Challenges Facing American Trade Law, 36
INT'L LAW. 159-96 (2002).
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event was the Fourth Ministerial Conference of the World Trade
Organization ("WTO") held at Doha, Qatar from 9 - 13 November
2001. The conventional wisdom is that the Doha Conference was
a "success."2 Because of two unmet challenges that concern the
Third World and the Muslim World, the conventional wisdom
may be wrong - or, at least, giddy.
"This has been a hell of a good week for the WTO," said the
European Union's ("EU") Trade Commissioner 3  - after
complaining repeatedly that "We [the EUI have got nothing. We
are the orphans of the WTO."4 The rosy conclusion about Doha is
based not so much on the accession of China and Taiwan (though
the end of their long road to Membership certainly was good
news), and certainly not on the waiver granted to African,
Caribbean, and Pacific countries for receipt of preferential trade
benefits from the EU, as on the agreement of an agenda for a
new round of multilateral trade negotiations. 5 The sanguineness,
urged WTO Director-General Mike Moore, extends to developing
countries, because the new round should benefit them.6
So, while not every day in Doha went swimmingly, 7 the end
result was an ostensible triumph - the "Doha Development
Agenda" ("DDA"). The new round is scheduled to last 3 years,
starting after the Fifth Ministerial Conference, in Mexico City in
2003, and completing on 1 January 2005.
What is on the DDA?
The DDA includes a large number of items, most notably the
following:8
2 See, e.g., Michael Mann, Fischler Hails Doha Meeting as A Magnificent Success'
FIN. TIMES (London), Nov. 16, 2001, at 13 (quoting Franz Fischler, European Union
Agriculture Commissioner).
3 See Guy de Jonquieres, WTO Agrees to Launch Trade Round, FIN. TIMES (London),
Nov. 15, 2001, at 1.
4 See Guy de Jonquieres, All-Night Haggling in Doha Ends in Agreement, FIN. TIMES
(London), Nov. 15, 2001, at 11.
5 See, e.g., Raj Bhala, Poverty, Islam, and Doha: Unmet Challenges Facing American
Trade Law, supra note 1, at 160 n.8 (quoting Beyond Doha, ECONOMIST, Nov. 17, 2001, at
11, which stated that "[alt least they struck a deal").
6 See id. (stating the new round should benefit developing countries).
7 See, e.g., Guy de Jonquieres & Frances Williams, Global Activists Adopt New
Tactics, FIN. TIMES (London), Nov. 12, 2001, at 10 (chronicling the disputes of the first few
days of the Ministerial Conference).
8 The DDA is set forth in Ministerial Declaration, (Nov. 14, 2001), available at
http:llwww.wto.org/english/thewtoe/minist-e/minOl_e/mindecl-e.htm (last visited Apr. 6,
2003). Summaries of it are contained in Jonquieres, supra note 4; Jonquieres, supra note
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AGRICULTURAL SUBSIDIES. Negotiations on "reductions of, with a
view to phasing out, all forms of export subsidies" for farm
products and "substantial reductions in trade-distorting
domestic" support schemes, but "without prejudging the
outcome" of these talks, and taking into account the need for
special and differential ("S & D") treatment for under-developed
countries .9
INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS. Negotiations to eliminate or reduce tariff
and non-tariff barriers, including tariff spikes (i.e., peaks) on
sensitive products like textiles, with attention to exports from
poor countries. The reduction commitments need not be on a
reciprocal basis, so as to allow for S & D treatment for Third
World countries. 10
SERVICES. Continued negotiations on (1) market access for
financial, telecommunication, and transport services, and (2)
easing of immigration rules for employing workers on temporary
contracts.
TRADE REMEDIES. Negotiations on "clarifying and improving
disciplines" on anti-dumping ("AD") and countervailing duty
("CVD") rules (including fishing subsidies) as set forth in the
Uruguay Round Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of
the GATT 1994 (Antidumping Agreement) and the Agreement on
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures ("SCM Agreement"), but
at the same time "preserving the basic concepts, principles and
effectiveness of these Agreements and their instruments and
objectives ..... "1 The meaning of "instruments" is not entirely
clear, though the American position appears to be that it refers to
the trade remedy laws of the Member countries (e.g., United
3; Mann, supra note 2; Daniel Pruzin, Trade Officials Assess Winners, Losers in
Aftermath ofDoha Ministerial Meeting, 18 INT'L TRADE REP. 1856 (Nov. 22, 2001); Daniel
Pruzin & Gary G. Yerkey, WTO MemberNations Agree to Launch Development Round at
Tough Talks in Doha, 18 INT'L TRADE REP. 1814 (Nov. 15, 2001), available at
http://www.globalexchange.org/wto/itdlll501.html (last visited Apr. 6, 2003); Time to
Trade, WASHINGTON TIMES, Nov. 21, 2001, at A16; Frances Williams, Declaration on
Patent Rules Cheers DevelopingNations, FIN. TIMES (London), Nov. 15, 2001, at 11.
9 Ministerial Declaration, supra note 8, at 1 13-14.
10 See id at 16 (dealing with market access for non-agriculture products).
I I Id. at T 28.
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States AD and CVD rules).12 Moreover, in the negotiations, the
United States is likely to insist on disciplines against dumping
and illegal subsidization, as distinct from restraints on AD and
CVD measures that combat these unfair trade practices. 13
REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS. Negotiations on "clarifying and
improving disciplines and procedures" on customs unions and
free trade areas.14
ELECTRONIC COMMERCE. Agreement to extend until the Fifth
Ministerial Conference (2003) a ban (initially imposed at the
Second Ministerial Conference in Geneva in 1998) on imposing
tariffs on certain kinds of electronic commerce.
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY. 15 A Declaration that developing
countries will be immune from challenge under the Uruguay
Round Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (" TRIPS') if they seek to obtain medical supplies
via compulsory licensing in order to meet a public health crisis.
The Declaration provides that "The TRIPS Agreement does not
and should not prevent Members from taking measures to
protect public health," and should be understood and enforced in
a way "supportive of WTO Members' right to protect public
health and, in particular, to promote access to medicines for
all."1 6
GEOGRAPHIC INDICATIONS. Negotiations on the protection of
geographical indications of certain foods (namely, cheese, ham,
and rice), and on the establishment of a global system for
registering and notifying geographical indications on wines and
12 See Pruzin, supra note 8, at 1856 (stating how the U.S. will "undoubtedly" interpret
instruments).
13 See Gary G. Yerkey & Daniel Pruzin, US. Makes Concession in WTO Agenda
Talks on Clarifying Dumping, Subsidies Agreements, 18 INT'L TRADE REP. 1819 (Nov. 15,
2001) (pointing to its occurrence at the fourth ministerial meeting of the WTO).
14 Ministerial Declaration, supra note 8, at 29.
Is See Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, (Nov. 14, 2001),
(recommitting to the TRIPs agreement) available at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/minist-e/min0le/mindecl trips-e.htm (last visited
Apr. 6, 2003); see also Geoff Dyer, Activists Point to Flaws in Declaration on Drug
Patents, FIN. TIMES (London), Nov. 16, 2001, at 13 (discussing the Doha statement on
TRIPs).
16 Williams, supra note 8.
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spirits, with the possibility of extending the system to cover other
items (such as cheese, ham, and yogurt).
S & D TREATMENT ON SUBSIDIES. 17 Agreement on requests for
extension of the period for phasing out export and import
substitution subsidies under Article 27:4 of the SCMAgreement.
THE FOUR "SINGAPORE ISSUES": INVESTMENT, COMPETITION
POLICY, TRADE FACILITATION (I.E., SIMPLIFYING CUSTOMS
PROCEDURES), AND TRANSPARENCY IN GOVERNMENT
PROCUREMENT. Preparatory work to continue under WTO
Working Groups established at the First Ministerial Conference
in Singapore in 1996. Negotiations on the Singapore issues will
not commence until after the Fifth Ministerial Conference in
2003, and only if there is an "explicit consensus" to begin them.' 8
(Any Member could take a position preventing the
commencement - an assurance sought at Doha by India, and
gained through a statement by the Conference Chairman,
Qatar's Youssef Kamal.19) Such talks would deal with technical
assistance for, and capacity building in, developing countries, so
that they can assess the effects on them of alternative
proposals. 20
ENVIRONMENT. Negotiations on the (1) relationship between
WTO obligations and multilateral environmental agreements
("MEAs") (e.g., between TRIPs and the U.N. Convention on
Biodiversity, or between various WTO obligations and the
Cartagena bio-safety protocol for genetically modified
organisms), (2) information exchange between the WTO and
17 See Proposed Procedures for Extensions Under Article 27.4 for Certain Developing
Country Members, (Nov. 13, 2001) (suggesting mechanisms for extensions), available at
http://www.sice.oas.org/trade/WTODoha/mindecl scm-e.asp (last visited Apr. 6, 2003); see
also Daniel Pruzin, WTO Gets Applications from 18 Countries for Extended Deadline for
Subsidy Phase-Out, 19 INT'L TRADE REP. 47 (Jan. 10, 2002) (explaining the extended
deadline).
18 See Ministerial Declaration, supra note 8, at IT 20, 23, 26 (recognizing various
members' needs); see also Pruzin, supra note 8, at 1857 (discussing developing countries
who were successful).
19 See Daniel Pruzin, Moore Warns of "Difficult" Fifth Meeting of WTO in 2003 to
Resolve Singapore Issues, 18 INT'L TRADE REP. 1895 (Nov. 29, 2001) (reviewing minister's
agreements).
20 See Daniel Pruzin, WTO Chief Outlines Budget Needs to Support Doha
Development Agenda, INT'L TRADE REP. 1898, 1898-99 (Nov. 29, 2001) (reporting Director-
General Mike Moore requested a $10.7 million budget increase).
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MEA Secretariats, and (3) reduction of trade barriers to
environmentally friendly goods and services. Possible
negotiations, to be decided at the Fifth Ministerial Conference in
2003, on eco-labeling and other environmental matters.
Was Doha Really a Success?
The DDA sounds impressive. But, could it be the conventional
wisdom about it is wrong?21 That is, could it be Doha was neither
a success, nor a monstrous failure? Perhaps what happened was
procrastination put in the veil of the DDA, as the Financial
Thres suggested:
Few vital economic interests were at stake, or tangible
commercial gains made, and no bargaining positions
irretrievably surrendered.
The Doha talks will not directly affect the wealth of nations
or prices paid by consumers. They were talks about whether
to hold further talks on global trade liberalisation, and what
their broad parameters and goals should be.
... [T]he sparring was largely intended to defend national
pride, manage political perceptions and square lobbies and
constituencies at home.22
The insinuation is reasonable. A careful read of the DDA list
shows settlement of only two substantive trade law issues - on
(1) compulsory licensing of pharmaceuticals (a breakthrough
credited to Brazil in its bilateral negotiations with the United
States 23), though not on imports of inexpensive copies of patented
drugs, and (2) S & D treatment under the SCM Agreement.
Surely the intense future negotiations in agriculture, industry,
services, and electronic commerce that lie ahead, and the
possibility of blockage of talks on the Singapore issues, offset
21 Viewed most charitably to the WTO, the facts can be set aside that some items
(namely, agriculture and services) were part of the built-in agenda leftover from the
Uruguay Round, and other items have been on the agenda since 1996 (i.e., the Singapore
issues). Similarly, the Doha negotiators agreed to continue on-going work on improving
and clarifying dispute settlement rules with a target date of May 2003. See Pruzin &
Yerkey, supra note 8, at 1817.
22 See All-Night, supra note 4.
23 See id. (noting that the U.S. improved relations with Brazil).
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these resolutions. 24
Indeed, starting in 2004, the chance of trade wars over
agricultural export subsidies cannot be dismissed. The "peace
clause" in the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture ensures
that export and domestic support subsidies conforming to the
Agreement cannot be challenged as illegal. But, the clause has a
sunset date - 31 December 2003. Thereafter, cases brought
under the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing
the Settlement of Disputes ("Dispute Settlement Understanding,"
or "DSU) can be initiated against these subsidies, the infamous
examples of which are the EU's Common Agriculture Policy
("CAP") and some American programs. The round launched at
Doha is scheduled to finish one year after the peace clause
expires, i.e., on January first, 2005, and even that deadline
already has been cast in doubt as "hopelessly optimistic." 25 (The
Uruguay Round took seven years, 1986-1993.) Thus, the risk of
agricultural trade wars is particularly high in 2004, assuming
insufficient progress in the talks to eliminate the subsidies.
Unfortunately, the peace clause issue hardly was discussed at
Doha. That raises the question of whether procrastination at
Doha was inevitable. Arguably, it was, in no small part because
the United States failed to meet two significant challenges in
international trade law. Each failure stemmed from
miscalculation wrought by inability to see the world trading
system and its legal regime through the eyes of developing and
Islamic countries. When the leading trade power on earth errs,
dilly-dallying is not an occasion for rejoicing. Rather, it is - or
ought to be - a stimulus for re-calculation. Since Doha,
unfortunately, there has been little of that.
24 Cognizant of the risk that some developing countries might block negotiations on
the Singapore issues, WTO Director-General Moore has written publicly of his belief that
it is in the interests of developing countries to support these talks. He argues, quite
plausibly, that investment rules would help attract FDI, competition rules would help
break up cartels, transparency in procurement would help combat corruption, and trade
facilitation rules would lower export costs. See Mike Moore, Development Needs More
Than Trade, FIN. TIMES (London), Feb. 18, 2002, at 15; Guy de Jonquieres, Moore Speaks
Out on WTO Rules, FIN. TIMES (London), Feb. 18, 2002, at 11.
25 See Trade Officials, supra note 8, at 1858 (describing actions some countries intend
to take if agricultural negotiations fail by the expiration of the peace clause).
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What are the Challenges?
What were - and still are - those two unmet challenges?
"Poverty" and "Islam." First, the United States did not build a
consensus among developing countries for trade liberalization.
That failure stemmed from its persistent under-estimation of the
depth of suspicion in poor countries about the effects on them of
trade liberalization under the WTO agreements reached during
the Uruguay Round.
Second, the United States did not make a persuasive link
between trade liberalization, on the one hand, and the
enhancement of peace and stability through closer ties with
Islamic countries, on the other hand. This failure reflected
under-estimation of the potential contribution to national
security (not only of the United States, but the entire
industrialized world) from better integrating some of these
countries into the global trading system.
Thus, the argument against the conventional wisdom is that
the Doha Ministerial Conference was an exercise in temporizing.
That disappointing result was ineluctable. Why? Because the
WTO Member to which all other Members look for leadership
had not addressed, and to some degree not even acknowledged
the potency of, challenges involving the developing and Islamic
worlds.
Metaphorically, what occurred at Doha was "the can was
kicked down the road." The can is the body of substantive trade
law issues. The delegations did the kicking. Among those who
kicked with the biggest foot and the greatest force was the
United States (though the European Union ("EU") wore a large
shoe too). The disposition of the can - lying there, as it is now,
several yards down the street - is highly uncertain. It could be
kicked yet further down, it could be avoided entirely, or it could
be picked up and disposed of, in the sense of the issues it
metaphorically symbolizes could be resolved once and for all.
Why the Rosy Conventional Characterization?
If it is premature to dub Doha successful, then why is the
buoyant characterization of Doha the conventional wisdom?
Perhaps the community of civilized nations needed a "feel-good"
[Vol. 17:471
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interpretation after the Dreadful Day, 11 September. Perhaps
the courageous - and they were brave - delegates voyaging to
Doha with security threats needed to believe the personal risks
they took were not in vain. The answer also lies in the
atmosphere on 8 November. Were the expectations not low? If
little or nothing was expected by way of agreement on a
substantive agenda, then by that meaninglessly low threshold, of
course Doha was a "success."
Conversely, inflated expectations must be disclaimed. WTO
Ministerial Conferences would be wondrous affairs if they dealt
conclusively with every trade law issue of the biennium. Because
that is too much to ask of trade ministers - some of whom, in
contrast to their deputies, are not programmed for detailed give-
and-take sessions - in a week, agenda formulation is a necessary
part of these Conferences. An agreement for future talk is, by
definition, a possibility. But, the conventional wisdom sees lack
of agreement on an agenda (as occurred after the Third
Ministerial Conference in Seattle in 1999) as a melt down, and
avoidance thereof as success. That risks acceptance of under-
achievement, and this risk seems implicit in the post-Doha
buoyancy of United States Trade Representative ("USTR"),
Robert Zoellick: "We have removed the stain of Seattle."26 Well,
yes, thank God. But, if escaping a debacle is the best to expect,
then the casualty will be more than just a balanced
characterization of what really was achieved. It will be a candid
admission of the issues at stake, and a push to meet them.
Precisely that was the casualty of Doha.
The Argument
The argument is that at Doha, the can was kicked down the
road. Why was it kicked? Essentially (but, of course, not
entirely), because of twin failures: to address definitively
discordant views from poor countries, and to weave Muslim
countries into a cogent vision for national security. This
argument proceeds in four Sections.
Sections II and III lay out the trade law challenges not met by
26 See WTO Agrees to Launch Trade Round, supra note 3, at 1 (quoting Zoellick who
also suggested such an agreement would position the U.S. to receive fast-track authority
from Congress).
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the United States, and the miscalculations that lay behind the
failure to meet them. Section II discusses the challenge of
forging a consensus for multilateral trade liberalization, unmet
because of under-estimating hostility among developing countries
toward freer trade. Section III deals with the challenge of
associating trade liberalization with security enhancement,
unmet because of under-estimating how trade relations with
some Islamic countries might strengthen this link. Section IV
concludes with points about empathy and humility.
CHALLENGE ONE: THE TRADE-POVERTY LINK
Facts About the DDA
Perhaps developing countries, especially the least-developed
countries, "did better [at Doha] than even they had expected"27 in
obtaining assurances that TRIPS patent provisions would not be
used to block access via compulsory licensing to essential medical
supplies, and in keeping an explicit trade - labor rights link off
the DDA. Yes, the USTR's conciliatory style toward poor
countries won praise.2 8 True, they received "pledges of fresh
technical assistance"29 for capacity building, to include at least $9
million for a "Doha Development Agenda Trust Fund" for use in
training programs. 30 (Put aside the fact that the figure is
proposed, and the funding is through voluntary contributions by
Members. 31)
Still, is it excessive to identify contrasting views in the First
and Third Worlds of trade law and its effects as a great schism
plaguing the WTO? Third World activists urge a re-appraisal,
dubbing the new round a "disaster for the world's poor," with
Barry Coates, Director of the World Development Movement,
27 See All-Night, supra note 4. But see Seeds Sown for Future Growth, ECONOMIST,
Nov. 17, 2001, at 65 (reporting that "[p]oor countries were much less excited" about the
DDA).
28 See All-Night, supra note 4 (reporting that the U.S. adopted a more conciliatory
style towards other countries).
29 Id.
30 See Guy de Jonquieres, Move to Bring More Poor Countries to Trade Round, FIN.
TIMES (London), Feb. 4, 2002, at 6 (referring to plans for WTO fund to train trade
negotiators from poor countries).
31 See Daniel Pruzin, Moore Hails "Outstanding Year" for WTO, Says Budget Hike
Will Aid Poorer Members, 19 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 9 (Jan. 3,2002).
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calling the DDA "empty of development."32
Consider four facts about the DDA from a developing country
vantage point:
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND COMPULSORY LICENSING.-
Arguably, the Doha TRIPS Declaration grants no new rights
regarding compulsory licensing to developing countries.3 3 The
text of the Declaration clearly re-affirms the existing TRIPS
provisions. Paragraph 4 "reiterat[es] our [i.e., the WTO
Members'] commitment to the TRIPS Agreement," and
paragraph 5 "maintain[s] our commitments in the TRIPS
Agreement." These re-affirmations appear designed to ensure
compulsory licenses are granted in accordance with TRIPS
Article 31, which deals with the matter.
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND IMPORTS: 34 Notwithstanding the
possible controversy over whether the Doha TRIPS Declaration
actually expands the right of WTO Members to grant compulsory
licenses, the silence of the Declaration on imported
pharmaceuticals is telling. The Declaration benefits only those
poor countries with the capability to manufacture the necessary
medicines - otherwise, a compulsory license has no practical
value. The Declaration says nothing about whether a country
without this ability can override a patent in the interest of public
health by importing cheap copies of a patented drug from a third
country. The WTO's TRIPS Council has until the end of 2002 to
resolve the matter.
S & D TREATMENT FOR EXPORT SUBSIDY PHASE-OUTS.'35 Article
27:4 of the SCM Agreement gives developing countries until 1
January 2003 to phase out these prohibited (or "red light")
subsidies, while least-developed countries are exempt from the
obligation to eliminate them. An extension beyond this date is
possible, if an application was submitted to the WTO's SCM
32 James Harding & Michael Mann, Activists Call Deal "Disaster for Poor People',
FIN. TIMES (London), Nov. 15, 2001, at 11 (quoting Coates).
33 See Chris Rugaber, TRIPS Declaration Does Not Undermine IP Rghts,
Pharmaceutical Groups Say, 18 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1862-63 (Nov. 22, 200 1).
34 See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
35 See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
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Committee at least one year earlier (i.e., by 31 December 2002).
Eighteen developing countries met the deadline. The DDA states
that when the Committee approves the extension for phasing out
an export subsidy program, it will be renewed automatically each
year until the end of 2007, as long as the subsidizing country
does not change its program to prefer local firms, and follows
transparency obligations. However, only export subsidies
involving the full or partial exemption from tariffs and internal
taxes that existed before 1 September 2001 are eligible for
automatic renewal. Likewise, only a developing country with a
share of world merchandise export trade of less than 0.10
percent, and a gross national product in 2000 of $20 billion or
less, is eligible.
THE BAN ON TAXING E-COMMERCE: 36 The ban applies to digitized
goods, i.e., goods like printed materials, software, music, films,
and video games that could be shipped physically, but are
transmitted across the internet. However, assuming many such
goods were shipped in digitized form, the top 10 potential losers
of tax revenue from this ban, other than the EU (the largest loser
in dollar terms of foregone customs duties), Canada (6th), and
Israel (10th), would be developing countries: India (2nd); Mexico
(3rd); Malaysia (4th), Brazil (5th), China (7th), Morocco (8th), and
Argentina (9th).
These facts suggest that it is sensible to re-appraise the
heralded success of Doha. Lest there be any doubt, consider the
post-Doha remark of Director-General Moore: "We're setting
ourselves up for a difficult fifth ministerial." 37
Translating Economic Theory into Trade Practice
The starting point for a re-appraisal is to appreciate that for
most developed country WTO Members, trade law translates into
practice the economic theory in favor of eliminating tariff and
non-tariff barriers. Trade law is the device to implement
comparative advantage pioneered by classical economists,
namely David Ricardo, and embellished by neo-classical and
36 See Daniel Pruzin, Developing Countries Seen Losing Most From WTO E-
Commerce Duty Moratorium, 18 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1900 (Nov. 29, 2001).
37 Moore Warns, supra note 19.
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modern economists. Yet, industrialized countries do not
invariably use trade law for this purpose, hence the result is not
perfect implementation of economic doctrine.38 Were that so,
trade law texts would be blissfully short, mandating an end to
barriers without delay, exception, or allowance for recidivism.
In fact, for the industrialized countries, indeed for all WTO
Members, trade law has a key secondary function. It serves as a
political regulatory device, as the Financial 2'Ymes instructed in
Doha's wake:
Although countries benefit economically from dismantling
their own trade barriers, rather than those of trading
partners, political logic works the other way round. To win
domestic support for trade liberalization, politicians need to
show they are doing their utmost to open others' markets,
while conceding as little as possible.3 9
That is, trade law is a means to reach a new equilibrium
among domestic economic agents (producers, consumers, and the
government) when a shift to freer trade is contemplated. Trade
law manages the shift, typically eschewing a dramatic,
instantaneous expurgation of tariffs and quantitative restrictions
in favor of carefully crafted phase-out periods coupled with
safeguard remedies should dis-equilibrium (i.e., unacceptably
high short-term adjustment costs that might threaten the
political or social order) arise.
The First World's understanding of trade law as a translation
device is premised on the belief that the freer trade regime it
puts into practice is normatively good. The criterion for
"goodness" is a utilitarian calculation that, on balance, trade
liberalization is a gain for a country and, by extension, the world.
It is a static net gain rationale Ricardo gave in the 19th century,
and has been elaborated and refined in recent models of dynamic
gains.
Translation is precisely what many non-industrialized
countries dispute with wealthier WTO Members. In the view of
38 See Ronald A. Brand, GATT and United States Trade Law: The Incomplete
Implementation of Comparative Advantage Theory, 2 J. LEGAL ECON. 95 (1992) (arguing
that the translation of economic theory into practice is far from perfect, particularly
because of the (1) lack of private party participation in the application of trade rules, and
(2) interference to the operation of comparative advantage caused by trade remedies).
39 All-Night, supra note 4.
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these countries, the net gains are, first, theoretical. In practice,
they do not always work out quite the way economists predict,
because of the messy details of reality. That aside, the second
and more important objection is that net gains tend to accrue in
the First World.
Yes, some sectors in some developing countries benefit from
more export opportunities, and consumers in those countries
with sufficient incomes enjoy a broader and cheaper range of
consumption opportunities. Still, on balance, the perception is
that the legal regime of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade ("GATT") and WTO does not deliver the net benefits - in
the form of faster growth and income-poverty reduction - that
the First World and its economic theorists claim. Fifty years (i.e.,
since the GATT, dated 30 October 1947, entered into force on 1
January 194840) of trade liberalization may have done a lot of
good, but only for a handful of countries - at least that is the
impression. It is reinforced by assorted statistics and projections,
such as those of the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development ("UNCTAD"). UNCTAD forecasts that by 2015,
only one of the 49 of the world's poorest countries - Lesotho - will
cross the threshold of $900 per capita GNP, and thenceforth
graduate from the unhappy cohort of "least developed" countries
(those with less than $1,000 per capita GNP) to "developing"
countries. Of the remaining 48 countries, 21 will not cross it in
100 years.41
Never mind there is empirical evidence to rebut this
perception. Most recently, the World Bank's Policy Research
Report, Globalization, Growth, and Poverty (2002) points to a
strong association between (1) trade liberalization, and (2)
economic growth and poverty reduction.42 Forget, also, the well-
40 See Raj Bhala, INT'L TRADE LAW HANDBOOK 50 (2001) (discussing GATT).
41 See Alan Beattie & Frances Williams, Poor Countries' Talks to Aim at
"Deliverables", FIN. TIMES (London), May 14, 2001, at 9 (citing UNCTAD statistics
regarding poor countries' "graduation" from "least developed countries" status); Mike
Moore, How to Lit the Barriers to Growth, FIN. TIMES (London), May 14, 2001, at
21(discussing problems facing least developed countries).
42 Cf David Dollar & Aart Kraay, Spreading the Wealth, 81 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 120
(Feb. 2002) (concluding that over the last 20 years, the integration of developing countries
with developed countries has afforded poor people the opportunity to improve their lives);
David Dollar & Aart Kraay, Growth Is Good for the Poor (Development Research
Department, The World Bank Study, 2000) available at
www.worldbank.org/research/growthlabsddolakray.htm (last visited Apr. 6, 2003) (using
data from 80 countries over 40 years as evidence that openness to trade increases
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developed body of "S&D" treatment rules to help developing
countries manage political and social problems associated with
adjustment to freer trade (i.e., rules just for them that play the
secondary role of regulating the shift from an equilibrium
associated with a closed macro-economy to a new equilibrium of
an open macro-economy.)43 Focus on the incongruous outlook
held by Third World countries, which account for roughly 80
percent of the WTO's Membership.4 4 By listening to trade law
officials, practitioners, professors, and (tellingly) students in the
Third World, it is easy to detect widespread skepticism about
trade law and its effects.
The View from Poor Countries (Or Some of Them)
Even after Doha, the United States has yet to deal with
anecdotal evidence easily gathered by traveling to, for example,
South Asia (e.g., India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh), East Asia
(e.g., China, Vietnam, Laos, Malaysia, and Thailand), and Latin
America (e.g., Mexico and Argentina). The perceptions may be
grouped into ten general categories:
DOMINANCE OF THE GLOBAL TRADING SYSTEM. The global
trading system is dominated by a few hegemonic trading powers,
led by the United States. This minority tends to be far more
interested in gaining market access to, or shutting imports out
from, developing countries than in promoting export-oriented
growth in those countries. The powers preach free trade until
they come to the negotiating table with developing countries,
economic growth and that incomes of poor people in those countries rise proportionately
with growth); DAN BEN-DAVID ET AL., Trade, Income Disparity and Poverty (World Trade
Organization Special Studies No. 5) (1999) (arguing that developing countries that are
more open to trade are catching up with the living standards of developed countries, and
that trade liberalization contributes strongly to poverty alleviation).
43 See Raj Bhala, TRADE, GROWTH, & INJUSTICE pt. 4 (Found. Press, forthcoming
2003) (classifying and analyzing S & D treatment rules in "Theological Framework");
Peter Gallagher, GUIDE TO THE WTO AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 133-88 (2000)
(surveying S & D rules in Multilateral Trade Agreements and Dispute Settlement
Understanding, reached during Uruguay Round); Alice Alexandra Kipel, Special and
Differential Treatment for Developing Countries, in THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION
617, 626-60 (Terence P. Stewart ed. 1996) (explaining S & D rules in Uruguay Round
agreements).
44 See Robert B. Zoellick, U.S. Trade Representative, The WTO and New Global
Trade Negotiations: What's at Stake, Address Delivered to the Council on Foreign
Relations, Wash., D.C., Oct. 30, 2001, at 8. (The text was prepared for delivery and will be
distributed publicly).
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when they become mercantilists.
DOMINANCE OF THE WTO. The faces at the WTO Secretariat
evince dominance by a handful of industrialized countries. Of
the 552 positions there in 2001, 129 of them were occupied by
French citizens. 45  The country with the second-highest
representation was the United Kingdom (71 British nationals
held WTO Secretariat positions), followed by Spain (36),
Switzerland (31.5), Canada (26), the United States (23.5), Italy
(16), Germany (13), and Ireland (13). In other words, the top
nine represented countries were western and industrialized,
accounting for 359 of the 552 jobs, or 65 percent of the posts.
India was the only Third World country with notable
representation (with 10 Indians holding positions). Hardly any
nationals hailed from significant developing countries like
Malaysia (1.5 persons) and Thailand (2). The Secretariat also
fared poorly in staffing positions with citizens of newly
industrialized countries. None came from Singapore, and a de
minimis number from Korea (2), Brazil (2.5) and Mexico (2).
DOMINANCE OF THE LANGUAGES OF THE WTO. Any visitor to
www.wto.org has observed that three languages pre-dominate
the WTO: first and foremost, English, with French and Spanish
the other two functional languages. The same observation is
apparent from job ads posted by the WTO in prominent
publications like The Economist. Typically, English is required,
with proficiency in French or Spanish also required or highly
desired. According English the highest status makes sense. It is
the international language of business and the internet, and it is
the second most-widely used language in the world, with 514
million speakers.4 6 But, it is a distant second to Mandarin
Chinese, which boasts 885 million speakers. A close third to
English is Hindi, with 496 million speakers. Spanish follows
fourth, with 425 million, and then comes Russian (275 million),
45 The employment statistics can be found in Overview of the WTO Secretariat, Table
of Regular Staff by Nationality, available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/secre_e/
introe.htm (last visited Apr. 6, 2003) Notably, as of early 2003, there were 144.5
positions occupied by French citizens compared with 512.5 actual employees. The
difference between positions and employees reflected vacancies.
46 The statistics set forth herein are from a table on World Languages in Darlene
Superville, Global Forces Silence Ethnic Tongues, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2001, at A12.
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Arabic (256 million speakers) and Bengali (215 million speakers).
French is ninth in the top ten, with 129 million speakers
(Japanese is tenth with 126 million speakers), just about half of
the number who converse in Russian and Arabic, and 60 percent
of the number of Bengali speakers. From a developing country
perspective, even discounting the prominence of Spanish and
French in many developing countries, it is entirely reasonable to
wonder why both Spanish and French are featured so
prominently, while no importance seems to be placed on the key
non-western Third World languages, namely, Mandarin, Hindi,
Arabic, and Bengali. That tilt in favor of the European
languages - particularly French - may well reinforce the skewed
employment hiring patterns at the Secretariat noted above. The
tilt is all the more odd given that even in the affairs of the
European Commission, the dominant language is English (used,
for example, for two-thirds of all internal documents). 47 To put
the point more controversially, the languages used for WTO
affairs ought not to be selected with a view to appeasing
proponents of a French cultural exception (or those, comme ce
professeur, who admire French language and culture), nor to
entrenching the interests of any one country or small group of
countries in the Secretariat. Developing countries might
reasonably ask whether an approach like that taken by the
United Nations - designating a broader number of working
languages - might enhance the legitimacy of the WTO and the
ability of countries to participate. Or, they might take a more
business-like approach, and lobby for a universal English rule.
UNEQUAL BARGAINING. It is true many developing countries
"came of age" at Doha, by adroitly building coalitions, organizing
tactics, and setting goals.4 8 Examples were Nigeria (which, on
behalf of many African countries, argued successfully for deferral
of negotiations on government procurement and customs
procedures because poor countries lacked resources to negotiate
immediately 49), Tanzania, and Uganda50 Still, for two reasons,
47 See Daniel Dombey, How English Became the Main Euro-Speak, FIN. TIMES, Aug.
17, 2001, at 2 (discussing the prevalence of English).
48 Jonquieres, supra note 4 (discussing the importance of how talks were achieved).
49 See Gary G. Yerkey, US. Plans Early Push for Reform of Customs, Public
Procurement Rules in New WTO Talks, 18 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1935 (Dec. 6, 2001).
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the bargaining table where multilateral trade negotiations occur
remains slanted. The powerful WTO Members have large armies
of highly-trained trade lawyers, economists, and accountants
arrayed against a smaller number of less-expert representatives
from developing countries, some of whom hold multiple portfolios
(i.e., are responsible for several non-trade fields, and thus are
stretched in terms of time and energy). Moreover, there is a
mismatch of economies represented by officials at the table. The
dominant economies are diversified, hence they are unlikely to
experience serious adverse effects should access to one export
market be curtailed, or one export sector fair poorly. In contrast,
many developing country WTO Members have non-diversified
economies, reliant on one or a small number of commodity
exports, and their largest customers are the powerful Members.
Consequently, alienating the officials from those Members by
taking a hard-line at the table is not a strategic option.
LEGAL CAPACITY AND EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION. It is true
that in 2001, the United States gave over $555 million in trade
capacity assistance - more than any other country. 51 But, that
help must be juxtaposed with the problem. The Uruguay Round
produced the broadest and most complex trade agreements in
history. Establishing the legal capacity to untie them, and sew
them into the fabric of domestic law, is the problem. The
Decision taken at Doha on Implementation-Related Issues and
Concerns bespeaks the problem. 52 Developing countries, lacking
legal capacity, have a far worse time coming to grips with the
texts than developed countries, where the shortage of skilled
trade lawyers is not acute. Some - like Bangladesh - have not
yet enacted all of the accords into domestic law.
NEAR-IMPOSSIBILITY OF EFFECTIVE PARTICIPATION. Even if
Third World WTO Members comprehended and implemented
50 See id. In contrast, India's hectoring and obstructionism were highly controversial;
see also Letter from Per Gahrton, Member of the European Parliament, to the Financial
Times, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 24-25, 2001, at 8 (citing Pascal Lamy as real villain of WTO's
Doha meeting).
51 See Zoellick Speech, supra note 44, at 10.
52 See World Trade Organization, Ministerial Conference, Fourth Session (Doha),
Implementation-Related Issues and Concerns, Decision, Nov. 14, 2001 World Trade
Organization Declaration on New Trade Round, BLOOMBERG NEWS, Nov.14, 2001
(addressing number of implementation problems faced by Members).
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fully the legal agreements from the previous trade round, they
could hardly be expected to keep up with the pace of activity at
the WTO. Indeed, they have virtually no say over that pace. The
key WTO Members, in terms of setting agendas and priorities,
organizing meetings, formulating positions, and so forth, are the
usual suspects. Many developing country Members cannot
participate fully in WTO affairs as structured by the likes of the
United States. For example, there are dozens of meetings at the
WTO per week. However, many Third World Members cannot
afford a permanent mission in Geneva, or if they can, to staff it
with multiple delegates. Thus, coverage of these meetings -
much less playing a leading role in them - is impossible.
SKEWED BENEFITS FROM IMPORT LIBERALIZATION. The Uruguay
Round obligations aim to liberalize imports of goods and services,
which means the rules benefit the hegemonic trading powers
already possessing diversified economies. Their businesses gain
from increased market access when developing countries, in
compliance with the obligations, open to imports of goods and
services. Indeed, these multi-national corporations sometimes
are well-capitalized and expert enough to re-colonize developing
country economies, should they be permitted to do so. As for
import-competing sectors in developed countries, the risks from
further trade liberalization are low. In most such sectors, tariff
barriers already have been reduced to historically low levels, so
they already have made the transition to freer trade. In sectors
still protected by tariff spikes or quantitative restrictions, the
developed country WTO Members are wealthy enough to afford
adjustment assistance for dislocated workers and industries
(even if they do not always provide it on generous or efficient
terms), whenever liberalization occurs.
VICTIMIZATION BY TRADE REMEDIES. In some import-competing
sectors considered sensitive, developed countries eagerly and
vigorously use trade remedies - principally, AD, CVD, or
safeguards - to extend the nature and duration of protection.
There is a deliberate irony here. Those sectors tend to be
precisely the ones in which developing countries are most likely
to gain a comparative advantage (e.g., steel, textiles, low-value
added manufacturing items, and agriculture, especially cotton,
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rice, and sugar), were free trade allowed to reign in them.
Indeed, roughly 70 percent of exports from the poorest countries
are in farm products and labor-intensive manufactured goods
like textiles.53 Applying trade remedies impedes infant industries
growth in Third World countries, and thereby of competitive,
diversified economies.
NEGATIVE EFFECTS ON LEAST DEVELOPED COUNTRIES. Quite
evident are negative effects on the world's 49 least developed
countries of de facto mercantilism by a handful of powerful
countries, their dominance of the WTO and trade negotiations,
and the application of trade law obligations and remedies. 54 Of
these 49 countries (the largest of which is Bangladesh), 34 are in
Sub-Saharan Africa. The least developed countries are home to
about 10 percent of the world's population - over 600 million
people, who survive on an annual per capita GNP of less than
$250. Yet, in 1990, the least developed countries accounted for
0.48 percent of world exports. In 1999, the figure fell to 0.40
percent. Even if it were to rise significantly, the increase would
make little difference absent concomitant debt relief. Two-thirds
of the world's poorest 49 countries have unsustainable debt
burdens. Hence, investing new export earnings in local
economies would be compromised by their use for debt service.
LEGAL CAPACITY AND WTO LITIGATION. Whenever a Third
World country Member fails to meet its import liberalization
obligations, or is suspected of an unfair trade practice, it faces a
dumping or subsidization suit from a developed country.
Likewise, if a poor Member, employing fair practices, manages to
penetrate significantly a product market in a powerful WTO
Member, then it is likely to face a safeguard action. Whatever
the gravamen of the complaint, the consequent litigation will
follow the DSU In reality, most DSU cases are wars the
powerful WTO Members are best able to fight. Yes, small
countries have defeated large ones in some cases. But, in general
53 See Seeds Sown for Future Growth, supra note 27.
54 The statistics are from Alan Beattie & Frances Williams, Poor Countries' Talks to
Aim at "Deliverables," FIN. TIMES, May 14, 2001, at 5 (doubting will to tackle issues
facing LDCs); Mike Moore, How to Lift the Barriers to Growth, FIN. TIMES, May 14, 2001,
at 21 (stating that most citizens in the forty-nine least developed countries have been
bypassed by benefits in globalization).
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it is only powerful Members that possess armies of trade lawyers,
backed by multinational corporate interests. In some Third
World government agencies responsible for trade matters, like
the Bangladesh Ministry of Commerce, there is no full-time staff
of attorneys versed in international trade law equipped to handle
WTO complaints, much less to bring them. Nor is there a budget
to obtain the legal weaponry necessary to fight in Geneva.
Introducing this anecdotal evidence is not a comment on the
accuracy of the ten perceptions. It is offered for its probative
value. It demonstrates views of WTO Members in which live
roughly 4 of the world's 6 / billion people. That demographic
fact suggests, whether true or not, perception matters when held
by so large a block. Indeed, there is more than just anecdotal
evidence.
There is testimonial evidence of the lack of a consensus among
Third World countries for further trade liberalization. The
testimonies are from trade ministers representing these
countries at Doha. In their prepared statements, posted on the
WTO's website during the Conference, they highlighted the
disconnect between the promises of the Uruguay Round
agreements and their actual effects.55
The Ancient Melian Dialogue in a New Context
Apparently, the United States did not deal with these
perceptions in any systematic or effective way. Rather, it touted
the benefits of freer trade. It repeated its faith in the Uruguay
Round as a large part of the cure for Third World problems, 56
essentially saying: "Yes, well, whatever, don't worry; just look at
55 See, e.g., Statement by the Honourable Manuel Roxas II, Secretary of Trade and
Industry, (stating that "Proponents [of a new round of trade negotiations] again remind
us of the benefits that will accrue [to] developing countries if we agree to the issues which
make up this new round. Proponents cite the benefits from increased trade; for them, this
certainly has been their experience. Ours is different.").
56 See, e.g., Statement by H.E. Mr. Robert B. Zoellick, United States Trade
Representative, Nov. 10, 2001, at p. 2 (acknowledging implementation problems with
Uruguay Round agreements, but stating that "[tihe trade liberalization ushered in by the
Uruguay Round highlights the potential of more trade for developing nations"); Zoellick
Speech, supra note 44, at 8-9 (stating that "[tirade is a critical element - perhaps the most
important element - in economic development, offering the biggest, and most lasting,
dividends," and discussing a World Bank study indicating that developing countries that
open themselves to trade grow faster, and experience faster declines in poverty, than
those that do not, pointing to the benefits of openness experienced by South Korea and the
costs of protection incurred by Ghana, citing statistics on export growth from developing
countries after the Uruguay Round, and linking open trade with political reform).
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these statistics - keep liberalizing and things will improve."
The benefits are not chimerical, and the earnestness of
American's belief is not in doubt. The United Nations Secretary
General, Kofi Anan, may well be correct in declaring "[t]he poor
are not poor because of too much globalization, but because of too
little."57 Yet, perceptions sometimes get confused with reality. It
happened before and at Doha, and the mess has yet to be sorted
out. No unscrambling will occur so long as the American
response remains no more imaginative than sloughing off earnest
perceptions.
What will continue is a string of American "successes," in the
sense of trade negotiation agendas that, like the DDA, accords
with American producer interests. Yes, at Doha, the United
States "gave" some on intellectual property and dumping. But, it
made no dramatic pro-development commitments. To the
contrary, it continued to push to the agenda issues deeply
troubling to Third World WTO Members. Enforcing labor
standards, and increasing participation in WTO adjudication by
non-governmental organizations ("NGOs") are examples.
Certainly, these innovations promise long-term gains, to
developing country workers and to the legitimacy of the DSU
mechanism. But, from a poor country's perspective, both
initiatives could drive up its costs of production (resulting from
higher labor standards), and litigation costs (owing to more
complex procedures involving multiple parties). Thus, the poor
country might well view the Doha result not so much as a
success, but as an extension of the Ancient Greek Melian
Dialogue to international trade relations: that the strong will do
what they do, and the weak will suffer what they must.
CHALLENGE TWO: THE TRADE-ISLAM LINK
Enhancing Peace Through Trade
Since at least the 1978-79 Islamic Revolution in Iran,
Americans have gorged on a visual diet of scenes of angry
Muslims, dressed in traditional garb, burning the Stars and
Stripes, compelling women to wear a hijab (veil), and marching
57 Zoellick Speech, supra note 44, at 9.
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unquestioningly to a mullah's call of Allah-hu-Akbar ("God is
Great"). Imbalanced diets lead to bad health, and these victuals
have caused both seizure and paralysis. The convulsions are
about military defense - how to guard against the ostensible
Islamic threat to America's interests. The lack of movement
concerns trade law - how to integrate more fully Islamic
countries into the GATT - WTO system, and how that
integration might contribute to America's security.
A grand vision of international trade is that insofar as it leads
to economic growth and poverty reduction, it gives trading
nations a stake in the international economic order. As the
standard Ricardian paradigm predicts, stakeholders benefit from
a broader array of cheaper consumption opportunities owing to
increased imports, and from broader market access for exported
items they make. In turn, the incentive to engage in
international war or conflict diminishes. No economically
rational stakeholder would destroy the salubrious economic
linkages.
Peace through trade is not a turn-of-the-millennium insight.
In the 1930s, this vision prompted reversal of protectionist
legislation, and in the 1940s, the birth of multilateral economic
agreements like GATT. It was manifest in the work of President
Franklin Roosevelt's Secretary of State, Cordell Hull.5 8 Secretary
Hull helped dismantle many of the notorious Smoot - Hawley
tariffs by negotiating 32 bilateral trade pacts with 27 countries,
under the authority of legislation he supported, the Reciprocal
Trade Agreements Act of 1934.59 In these bilateral deals, he
inserted an unconditional most-favored nation ("MFN") clause,
thereby ensuring the spread of barrier reductions to third
countries. 60 This vision - while not forgotten - has not been
applied to the context in which it now is most needed: trade with
Islamic countries.
If opportunities created by trade liberalization nourish would-
58 See Michael A. Butler, CAUTIOUS VISIONARY - CORDELL HULL AND TRADE REFORM,
1933-1937, 164-65, 168-69 (1998) (explaining Hull's vision of liberal international
economic order, and quoting Hull's suggested language, which the President did not
accept, for the 1936 Democratic Party platform condemning any return to protectionism
and arguing that "the permanent security of the United States will be better assured by
the maintenance of the principles of international justice and fair dealing than by the sole
force of arms").
59 See Zoellick Speech, supra note 44, at 2.
60 See id.
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be Islamic entrepreneurs who otherwise might feed off, or be
ruined by, violence and terrorism, then surely it is in America's -
and the world's - security to offer the healthy sustenance. What
better way to do so than invite these countries to participate
more fully in global trade? Given that Islam now boasts 1.2
billion adherents (second only to Christianity's 2 billion
followers), 61 and appears to be the world's fastest growing
religion, is there really any choice but to make the invitation as
attractive as possible?
Differentiating Among Potential Islamic Trading Partners
Invitations, done properly, are sent with care. Paying heed to
which Islamic countries ought to be invited is no less important
than coming around to the understanding that some ought to be
invited. Precisely how is the United States to decide among the
potential invitees to the trade liberalization gala? The gala
really is a process, not a one-off event. It is meaningful and
mutually rewarding participation in the GATT - WTO system
and sensible regional and bilateral free trade arrangements.
Is one cause of paralysis in its trade law an implicit acceptance
of the dichotomy between "fundamentalists" and "moderates"?
That beguiling dichotomy is a veil over the variegated responses
from the Islamic World in its struggle to come to terms with
Western culture. Some parts of that World see the culture as
decadent, and embodied in wave after wave of exports of goods
and services. Trade links are regarded as the conduit for the
marauding exports. 62 By extension, the pre-eminent institution
dedicated to widening the conduit, the WTO, and its prominent
champion, the United States, are viewed with suspicion. The
adjective "some" must be stressed. This perspective hardly is
61 See Tad Szulc, Abraham - Father of Three Faiths, 200 NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC 90,
96 (Dec. 2001) (retracing trek of Abraham, patriarch of three major religions, through
Middle East, and providing demographic statistics).
62 For a discussion of Iran's fulfillment of free trade requirements in order to enter
into WTO. See generally Jahangir Amuzegar, Iran's Crumbling Revolution, FOREIGN
AFFAIRS, Jan.-Feb. 2003, at 44. The matter of culture and trade tends to be viewed as a
conflict between, on the one hand, France and Francophone countries, and, on the other
hand, the rest of the world. The matter takes legal shape in terms of an exemption from
GATT and WTO obligations for cultural industries. This approach is like viewing a
splendid room in Versailles through a keyhole - many parts of the room remain hidden
from view. Similarly, many linguistic, ethnic, and religious groups beyond the
Francophone world are concerned about the effect of trade liberalization on their
traditions and ways of life. Constituencies in the Islamic world are among such groups.
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universal among Muslims. Moreover, an irony must not be lost -
who is threatening whom? Many Americans believe their
country's interests are under siege from a "militant Islam,"63 all
the more so after 11 September. This belief puzzles some
Muslims, who think themselves threatened by an exploitative,
well-financed, and militarily superior, West - ever since the
Crusades. 64
In brief, appreciating subtleties and nuances among potential
invitees in the Islamic World to the gala is necessary to treat the
paralysis in American trade law, and to move toward a durable
nexus between trade and security. That is, the challenge is to
sort out the panoply and identify counterparts sharing the vision
Secretary Hull embodied. To help meet this challenge, there is
no dearth of journalistic and think-tank literature on trends in
Islamic countries. But, among the highly-regarded academic
discussions are the works of Professor John Esposito - namely,
Voices of Resurgent Islam (1983), Islam - The Straight Path
(1991), Islam and Politics (3rd ed. 1991), and The Islamic Threat:
Myth or Reality? (rev'd ed. 1992).65 Professor Esposito moves
beyond the dichotomy and uncovers three categories of response
by the Islamic World over the last 100-150 years to the perceived
Western threat.
The first response, also the most conservative, is "Traditional
Reformism." It calls for full implementation of, and strict
adherence, to the Shari'a ("the Sacred Law of Islam"66). The
Shari'a is conceived as a body of principles and obligations
grounded firmly in the Koran and Sunna 67 (the words and deeds
63 For a discussion of biases in media coverage that result in Islam being seen as
synonymous with religious extremism and terrorism see, e.g., EDWARD W. SAID,
COVERING ISLAM. To be sure, not all of the accounts have taken this approach. For a
collection of essays on possibility of Islamic renaissance see, e.g., RICHARD N. FRYE ED.,
ISLAM AND THE WEST (1957).
64 See AMIN MAALOUF, THE CRUSADES THROUGH ARAB EYES 176-200 (Jon Rothschild
trans., Schocken Books 1985) (1983) (relying on the works of Arab chroniclers for an
account of Saladin and the defeat of the Crusaders).
65 This typology, which is summarized below, is explained by Professor John Swanson
in the lecture series, Islam (1997) (Part II of the "Great World Religions" course, available
on tape from The Teaching Company), and the accompanying outline. I draw from that
lecture as well as Professor Esposito's works.
66 JOSEPH SCHACHT, AN INTRODUCTION TO ISLAMIC LAW 302 (Clarendon Press 1982)
(1982).
67 See KAREN ARMSTRONG, ISLAM - A SHORT HISTORY 202 (Weidenfeld & Nicholson
2000) (defining "sunah"). I
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of the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH68)). According to the Classical
Theory of the Sharia,69 these two are the most important - or
"fundamental" - fonts of law. Lesser emphasis is placed on the
remaining sources, Qiyaas (analogical reasoning7O) and Ijmaa
(consensus), which developed over the last 1,400 years (since the
Prophet's death in 632 A.D.) through the work of the ulama
(religious scholars7 1).
The logic behind the Traditional Reformist call is that the
Shari'a is a complete system not in need of amendment or
supplement by modernist legislation or policy-oriented reasoning.
Its inherent sobriety makes it the most exacting and, not
surprisingly, the least popular (in terms of the number of Islamic
societies that have heeded this call) response to the West. Saudi
Arabia under the influence of the Wahhabi movement, and
Afghanistan under the former Taliban regime, are among the few
examples of Traditional Reformism in practice.
In the Esposito-inspired scheme, the second response to
Western values embedded in goods and services exports is "Neo-
Traditional Reformism." Not unlike Traditional Reformists, Neo-
Traditional Reformists seek to return to Islamic traditions based
on the Koran and Sunna, which are accepted as the fundamental
sources of the Shari'a.72 Neither response wants to alter basic
traditions in light of Western influence. However, the word
"Neo" is the clue to the difference between the two responses.
Traditional Reformists see nothing they like in Western values
or structures. Their "reform" is rather like turning back the
clock to the time of the recitation of the Koran and establishment
of the Sunna. Neo-Traditional Reformists also seek guidance in
the Koran and Sunna, but with a view to the present and future.
Indubitably, the consequent reactions must be consistent with
68 "PBUJH" is an Islamic term of respect typically following a reference to the name of
the Prophet Muhammad. It stands for "Peace Be Unto Him." To my mind, it is
unfortunate when western writers ignore this acronym. Having stated it initially, for
reasons of economy, hereinafter I shall assume it implicitly. No disrespect is intended by
this economy.
69 See Schacht, supra note 66, at ch. 9 (explaining the Classical Theory).
70 Id., at 300.
71 See Armstrong, supra note 68, at 202 (defining "ulama").
72 Not surprisingly, IbnTaymaiya is popular among Neo-Traditionalists. Living in
Syria during the late 13th and early 14th Centuries A.D., he was one of the prominent
"Rejectionists," a critic of the great synthesis of AI-Ghazali - and one who emphasized the
Koran and Suma. Neo-Traditionalists look to his methodology for inspiration in coming
to terms with modernity.
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patterns in traditional Islamic society - yet, they are novel
rejoinders. In sum, the response earns its prefix, because it
returns to fundamental sources to find new ways to revive
Islamic society, and the innovations can be justified precisely
because they are grounded in tradition. 73
That is not to say Neo-Traditional Reformists want an
accommodation with western values and structures. On the one
hand, not everything about the West coming via cross-border
trade is worthy of embargo. Science and technology can be value
free, and used to benefit Islamic societies. On the other hand,
contradictions with the essential values of the Koran and Sunna
are to be avoided. Neo-Traditionalists examine the (sometimes
literal) meaning of the Koran, with a view to re-directing their
societies in response to modernity. Likewise, re-discovery of the
Sunna may result in societal re-orientation respectful of patterns
established during the Prophet's days. Accordingly, there is a
certain "case-by-case" methodology in this response, with an
underlying wariness of the West.
The third response in Esposito's typology is "Liberal
Reformism." It is unequivocally distinct from both Traditional
and Neo-Traditional Reformism. It accepts as a legitimate
objective accommodation with what the West has on offer.
Liberal Reformists urge Islamic societies to change in the Global
Age, albeit in a manner that accords with the guidance of the
Koran and Sunna. Rather than seeing these fonts of the Shari'a
as irreconcilable with the West (the Traditional Reformist
tendency) or in an uneasy tension with the West (the Neo-
Traditional Reformist tendency), Liberal Reformists see them
illuminating a constructive and positive relationship with the
West.
Their light reveals no contradiction between their essential
precepts, on the one hand, and Western science, technology, and
some Western values, on the other hand. In other words, for
Liberal Reformists, it is possible to go back to the Koran and
Sunna, and use them to construct a modern Islamic society. That
society is well-adjusted to globalization, and seeks to draw out
73 What are examples of "new" responses - reforms to Islamic society from within -
put forth by the Neo-Traditionalists? Most notably, there is the Iranian Revolution of
1978-79 and the subsequent development of the Islamic Republic of Iran, and the Muslim
Brotherhood movement that began in Egypt in the 1920s, and remains active.
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what is best from the West. But, it also is inspired by 1,400
years of defining and elaborating the Sharia.
The obvious flexibility of Liberal Reformism derives from a
concept of the divine origin of the "best." What is "best" in any
society - Christian or Muslim - is so because God put it there in
the first place. That origin imparts "best-ness." So, even if a
good or service is exported from the West, if it is "best," then
accommodating it surely is consistent with guidance from the
Koran and Sunna. Certainly, accommodation does not mean
capitulation. If the ultimate origin of the import is not divine,
hence it is not the "best," then rejection would be appropriate,
pursuant to guidance from the Koran and Sunna.
Two Important Types ofPartners
By eschewing a division of the Islamic World into
"fundamentalists" and "everyone else," and appreciating
perceptive delineations of the type suggested by Esposito, it is
easier to consider two tasks for American trade law toward the
Islamic World: (1) identifying worthy invitees, and (2) issuing
sincere invitations to the trade liberalization gala. Neither task
is easy.
Each demands empathy from American trade officials, i.e.,
realization they are not alone in sensing threat, and thus
appreciation for how the varied Islamic responses to the West
and its values bespeak differences in enthusiasm for engagement
in Hull's vision for world trade. Which response predominates in
which country? In a single country, two, or even all three,
responses, may co-exist (uneasily), depending on which
geographic area, or which ethnic, linguistic, or ideological group
is examined. Unscrambling the complexities and assessing
which response is (or can be bolstered to become) dominant is the
heart of the Islam Challenge.
This Challenge is tough in the post-11 September Era. Since
then, the United States has re-invigorated the dichotomy,
putting Islamic countries into one of two camps: evil terrorists
and their rogue-nation supporters (ie., the fundamentalists); and
good allies seeking to bring terrorists to justice (i.e., everyone
else). That rhetoric is appealing in the War on Terrorism. It is
not a basis on which to build a network of trade ties in the War
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for Prosperity. Indeed, it is a basis America rejected in its recent
history. Had the good-versus-evil mind-set carried over from
Second World War battles to post-War trading strategy, perhaps
America would not have invited former enemies into the
Marshall Plan or multilateral trading system. Arguably, the
United States is rejecting the good-versus-evil approach in its
economic policy toward Vietnam, Cambodia, and the Balkans.
Thus, the second task - having identified proper invitees, issue
the invitations - really is more of an extension than a revolution.
Evidently, adherents to one movement, Liberal Reformism, are
favorably disposed to fuller participation in the multilateral
trading system and appropriate regional and bilateral trading
arrangements. Neo-Traditional Reformists may not be
implacably averse. Sincere invitations ought to be issued to
countries dominated (or possibly so) by them. Inviting Liberal
Reformists, and possibly also Neo-Traditional Reformists, may
encourage these responses. The invitations are an opportunity to
show global trade is neither a vehicle for a Pax Americana nor
inconsistent with the essential principles of the Koran and
Sunna. The invitations could contribute to America's national
security interest, and to international order.
How so? First, if there is anything to the Hull-type vision of
peace through trade, then impoverished Islamic countries that
grow economically in part through expanded trade will gain a
stake hold in the global trade regime. (Their impoverished state
is a point of intersection between the Poverty and Islam
Challenges.) To a rational calculator, destroying that regime
may be a lot less appealing once its bounties flow to all segments
of a society.
Second, an invitation may impress Liberal Reformists, and
possibly also Neo-Traditional Reformists, that another great
schism in the world economy (one in addition to that between the
First and Third Worlds) is unacceptable. That emerging divide is
between the capitalist countries, mostly of Christendom or in
which Christianity is growing, and developing countries of the
Muslim World. The invitation may underscore that the destiny
of WTO Members is a common one: economic prosperity and
physical security; or, economic stagnation (if not worse) and
physical insecurity (again, if not worse).
Third, the invitation may highlight the importance the United
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States places on the first word in the WTO - "World." Some
trade gurus opined that the WTO was not worthy of its name
until China, with 1.2 billion people, became a Member. 74 They
were right, and the same rationale applies to the Islamic World,
with its comparable number of people. To be sure, many Islamic
countries already are WTO Members - but (as discussed below)
some prominent ones are not. And, those that hold Membership
are not necessarily integrated into the club in the fullest degree.
Only the Jordan FTA Thus Far
Highlighting countries influenced by Liberal Reformism, and
possibly also those swayed by Neo-Traditional Reformism, and
sending off sincere invitations to them, does not seem to be on
the agenda of American trade officials. The United States
recently completed bilateral FTAs with Singapore (on 15 January
2003) and Chile (on 11 December 2002), and now is negotiating
seriously an FTA with a major ally in the military campaign
against Iraq, namely, Australia. With respect to pursuing
comprehensive and deep FTAs with Muslim countries, it would
be inaccurate to characterize American trade officials as
completely paralyzed. But, perhaps it would be fair to say they
have been at least partially immobile.75 Today, the only invitee is
Jordan.
The United States signed a free trade agreement ("FTA") with
74 See Raj Bhala, Enter the Dragon, 15 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 1469, 1480 (2000) (noting
that the world's most populated country is not a member of WTO).
75 To be sure, on the eve of the Doha Conference, the USTR wrote of the Hull-type
link between trade liberalization and advancing the causes of political reform and
economic growth. See Robert B. Zoellick, Countering Terror with Trade, WASHINGTON
POST, Sept. 20, 2001, at A35 (noting that the application of the argument to Congress was
not well-received by the ranking Democrat on the House Ways and Means Committee,
Charles Rangel, who accused the U.S. Trade Representative of questioning the patriotism
of opponents of fast-track negotiating authority, and that the Trade Representative
disclaimed that implication); see also Trading Barbs, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2001, at 15;
Jim Landers, Trade-Terrorism Rhetoric Faulted, THE DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Oct. 1,
2001, at 1D. Yet, the link was spelled out more for the benefit of a Congress hesitant to
grant trade-negotiating authority to the President than for the benefit of an Islamic
World (or parts thereof) dubious about how it fits into the multilateral trading system.
The emphasis is understandable in the calculus of inside-the-Beltway trade politics, but it
hardly matters in that "other" World.
On the FTAs with Chile and Singapore, and the negotiations with Australia, see
Christopher S. Rugaber et al, Grassley to Separate Chile, Singapore Bills; Rep. Thomas
Plans to Take Up Bill in Spring, 20 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 210 (Jan. 30, 2003),
Christopher S. Rugaber, USTR Announces Timetable for Australia Trade Talks; Industry
Groups List Concerns, 20 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 182 (Jan. 23, 2003).
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Jordan, which entered into force on 17 December 2001 following
President Bush's proclamation on 7 December. 76 Under it, tariff
and non-tariff barriers on almost all agricultural and industrial
products traded between the two countries will be eliminated
within 10 years, 77 with the longest phase-out period for the
tariffs currently at the highest levels.7 8 The pact also reduces
barriers to trade in services (especially finance,
telecommunications, couriers, and energy distribution), and
mandates adherence to international standards for intellectual
property rights.79
However, from the perspective of Liberal Reformists and Neo-
Traditional Reformists, especially those in Arab countries, surely
three facts about the Jordan FTA are telling. First, the FTA
came about more than 15 years after America's first FTA with
another country in the Middle East - Israel. The Israel - United
States FTA was signed on 22 April 1985,80 and implementing
legislation was passed by both houses of Congress and signed by
President Reagan on 11 June 1985.81 The Jordan deal remains
America's only FTA with an Arab nation, indeed with any
Islamic nation.82
Second, the Jordan FTA is commercially insignificant, and
thus economically unthreatening to the United States. In 2000,
the United States exported $306 million worth of goods to
Jordan, while Jordan exported $73 million to the United States.8 3
76 See President Signs Proclamation to Bring US.-Jordan FTA Into Effect on Dec. 17,
18 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 2006 (Dec. 13, 2001).
77 Id.
78 See Gary G. Yerkey, US Signs Free-Trade Pact with Jordan that Includes Labor,
Environment Rules, 17 INT'L. TRADE REP. (BNA) 1653 (Oct. 26, 2000). Specifically, there
are four broad categories for eliminating industrial tariffs: (1) existing tariffs below 5
percent are phased out in 2 years, (2) existing tariffs between 5 and 10 percent are phased
out in 4 years, (3) existing tariffs between 10 and 20 percent are phased out in 5 years,
and (4) existing tariffs over 20 percent are phased out in 10 years. Id. at 1653.
79 See Yerkey, supra note 78, at 1653 (noting agreement terms covering both services
market and intellectual property rights standards).
80 See HANDBOOK, supra note 40, at 58.
81 See 19 U.S.C. § 2112 (1985) (codifying agreement between United States and
Israel); see also HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 107TH CONG., 1ST SESS., OVERVIEW
AND COMPILATION OF U.S. TRADE STATUTES 262 (Comm. Print 2001) thereinafter
Overview (discussing the United States/Israeli pact formed in 1984).
82 Id., at 264-65 (noting that in 1995, Congress delegated to the President
proclamation authority to modify tariffs on products from the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and
industrial zones between Israel and Egypt and Israel and Jordan, and that this delegation
took the form of an amendment to the Israel FTA).
83 See President Signs, supra note 76.
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These statistics evince a large bilateral trade surplus that the
FTA is unlikely to dent. The International Trade Commission
confirmed that lack of a threat. Its report84 concluded the FTA
would have no measurable impact on American exports, given
the insignificant share of American exports to Jordan relative to
total American exports ($270 million and $642 billion,
respectively, in 1999). As for imports, again there would be no
measurable impact, save for one sector - textiles and apparel -
where Jordanian imports would rise. Yet, the overall impact on
imports into, and production and employment in, the United
States of the rise in Jordanian textiles and apparel imports
would be negligible, because of the small share of Jordanian
imports in total American imports ($31 million versus $1 trillion
in 1999).
In brief, Liberal Reformists and Neo-Traditional Reformists
might say the United States was sacrificing nothing by entering
into an FTA with Jordan. Indeed, they might note (with a touch
of cynicism) that the pact contains a safeguard clause to guard
against import surges of a particular commodity by "snapping
back" the pre-pact level of protection (though, of course, the
remedy is not one-sided, as Jordan could invoke it).85 Also, they
might point to usage in the FTA of the "Breaux-Cardin" rule of
origin for textile and apparel products, specifically certain fabric
products, and silk handkerchiefs and scarves. 86 That rule deems
the country of origin of such products to be the country in which
the base fabric is knit and woven. The rule shifts backward in
the multi-step production process (growing or cultivation of fiber,
spinning of yarn from fiber, knitting and weaving of yarn to
make fabric, cutting and sewing of fabric, and final assembly of
cut and sewn pieces) the key event determining origin. The
further back the dispositive event, the more protectionist the
origin rule. Hence, the Reformists could point out, duty free
treatment would not be given to these products from Jordan,
84 See U.S. INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION, ECONOMIC IMPACT ON THE UNITED
STATES OF A U.S. - JORDAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT, Inv. No. 332-418 viii (Pub. 3340,
Sept. 2000) (finding that a United States/Jordan trade pact would likely have minimal
impact ).
85 See Yerkey, supra note 78, at 1653 (describing the method for dealing with over-
importation of an individual commodity).
86 See Gary G. Yerkey, US Near Completion of Talks on Bilateral Free-Trade Pact,
Sources Say, 17 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1574 (Oct. 12, 2000) (noting the Breaux-Cardin
measure).
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unless they were made of fabric knit and woven in Jordan.
The third telling fact is that the delivery of the invitation to
Jordan was contentious. Negotiating the FTA led to a polarized
debate, though less so with the Jordanians as within Congress,
over labor and environmental provisions. 87 With the Jordanians,
the agreement to start negotiations was announced by President
Clinton and King Abdullahon 6 June 2000.88 Negotiations
finished, and the FTA was signed, on 24 October 2000.89
President Clinton sent the FTA to Congress on 6 January 2001,90
and the Senate passed the pact on 24 September 2001,91
following House passage on 31 July.92 Because the Clinton
Administration negotiated the FTA, the views of its labor and
environmental supporters were manifest, namely, by the
inclusion of labor and environmental provisions in the text of the
FTA itself. The Jordanians acquiesced, but the Republicans in
Congress did not drop the matter quietly.
Movement of these provisions from side agreements, to which
they were relegated in the North American Free Trade
Agreement ("NAFTA") into the main body of the document, was
of great symbolic significance. Republicans in Congress feared a
precedent was being set by the change of position, 93 the first time
in American trade law history that provisions on the enforcement
87 See Nancy Ognanovich, Bush Tells Abdullah He Will Push Hill to Adopt Jordan
Free-Trade Agreement 18 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 632 (Apr. 19, 2001) (stating
Republicans view sanctions to enforce domestic labor and environmental laws as trade-
restrictive and against U.S. interests).
88 See Gary G. Yerkey, U.S., Jordan Make 'Substantial" Progress in Talks on Free
Trade Agreement, USTR Says, 17 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1224 (Aug. 3, 2000) (stating
"agreement to initiate negotiations was announced by U.S. officials following a meeting
between President Clinton and King Abdullah on June 6 in Washington, D.C.").
89 See US. Signs, supra note 78, at 1653 (stating the U.S. and Jordan signed free-
trade agreement on October 24).
90 See Gary G. Yerkey, President Clinton Sends Congress Bill to Implement Jordan
Free-Trade Pact with Jordan, 18 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 80 (Jan. 11, 2001) (stating that
on January 6 President Clinton sent proposed legislation to implement free-trade
agreement to Congress).
91 See Gary G. Yerkey, Senate Approves Free Trade Pact with Jordan, Clearing Way
for Enactment, 18 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1533 (Sept. 27, 2001) (stating on September
24, the Senate approved legislation to implement U.S.-Jordan Free Trade Agreement).
92 See Rossella Brevetti, Senate Panel, House Approve Measure on Jordan FTA, but
Gramm Still Dissatisfied, 18 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1244 (Aug. 2, 2001) (stating the
House approved implementation of the U.S.-Jordan Free Trade Agreement on July 31).
93 See Senate Panel, Houser Approve, supra note 92, at 1244 (mentioning Rep.
Sander Levin of Michigan, criticized the exchange of letters as setting bad precedent); see
also Gary G. Yerkey, House Democrats Hail "Precedent" Set by Labor, Environmental
Clauses in Jordan FTA, 17 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1685 (Nov. 2, 2000) (stating U.S.-
Jordan free-trade agreement sets important new precedent).
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of labor and environmental rights were placed in the main body
of a trade pact.94 Worse yet, the provisions called for the
imposition by one country of "appropriate or commensurate" 95
measures - possibly meaning trade sanctions, but perhaps also
including fines or decreases in foreign aid96 - against the other
country if the second country violated its own labor or
environmental laws.97 These measures would follow a decision of
a three-person arbitral panel, which would be selected (one
member by the United States, one member by Jordan, and the
third member by mutual agreement) to rule on any dispute.98
Any measures imposed by the United States ultimately would be
for the President to decide. Republican opposition was overcome
in part by letters from the USTR to the Jordanians, in which the
USTR stated its intention not to invoke these enforcement
procedures in a way that would block trade. 99 The 11th September
attacks virtually ensured Republicans would support the FTA,
notwithstanding the labor and environmental provisions and
their centrality in the text, because they saw Jordan as anally in
counter-terrorism 100
94 See Gary G. Yerkey, USTR Vows to Work for Compromise Between GOP,
Democrats on Jordan FTA, 18 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 554 (Apr. 5, 2001) (stating "[tihe
Agreement-for the first time in the test of any U.S. trade pact-contains provisions
requiring both the United States and Jordan to enforce their labor and environmental
laws or face the possibility of sanctions).
95 See Rossella Brevetti, Gramm Vows to Block Jordan FTA Unless Sovereignty
Concerns Addressed, 18 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1159 (July 19, 2001) (stating FTA
contains the language "appropriate or commensurate" measures if either country does not
enforce its labor or environmental laws in order to gain trade advantage).
96 See Rossella Brevetti, Baucus Sees Flexibility in Language on Environment, Labor
in Jordan FTA, 18 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 757 (May 10, 2001) (stating phrase could
encompass a variety of measures).
97 See Senate Approves, supra note 91, at 1533 (mentioning the pact allows either
country to impose trade sanctions where domestic laws governing labor or environmental
standards have been violated).
98 Under the pact U.S. and Jordan are permitted to name one member each to a panel
that will adjudicate disputes and a third member will be mutually agreed on by both
parties. See US. Signs, supra note 89, at 1653. One senior trade official from the United
States indicated the dispute resolution mechanism was more informal than that
contained in the DSU or NAFTA, and modeled after the procedures in America's FTA
with Israel. Id.
99 See Senate Panel, House Approve, supra note 92, at 1244 (mentioning the Zoellick
letter states "[m]y Government would not expect or intend to apply the Agreement's
dispute settlement enforcement procedures to secure its rights under the Agreement in a
manner that results in blocking trade"); see also Senate Approves, supra note 91, at 1533
(mentioning Zoellick, sent his letter to Jordan saying "the United States would not expect
or intend to apply the dispute settlement 'enforcement procedures' with respect to labor or
environmental matters in a matter that results in blocking trade.").
100 See Senate Approves, supra note 91, at 1533 (mentioning U.S.-Jordan FTA as part
of Bush administrations counterterrorism efforts).
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The history of the Israel - United States FTA is a contrast not
lost on Islamic reformists. 101 The Israelis originally proposed a
bilateral FTA in 1981. On 29 November 1983, President Reagan
and Prime Minister Shamir agreed to commence negotiations,
which began in earnest in mid-January 1984. These negotiations
were conducted by the U.S. Trade Representative ("USTR")
pursuant to the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, wherein Congress
delegated authority to the Executive branch to enter into the
negotiations. Labor and environmental issues did not snag the
negotiations, and no provisions on these issues were included in
the final text. To be sure, the linkages between trade and labor,
and between trade and the environment, were not as politically
prominent in the early and mid 1980s as they would become at
the turn of the millennium. Still, they could not have been
unknown during the negotiations with Israel.
The View from the Islamic World (Or Part of It)
What has happened in the period since the Jordan FTA
entered into foree?102 Arguably, little progress on invitations to
Islamic countries has been made. To the contrary, the record of
American trade law toward the Islamic World could be
characterized, not entirely unfairly, as one of more snubs than
invitations.
Consider the following eight points as they might be seen
through the eyes of trade officials from Muslim countries.
No OTHER FTAs. The United States has eschewed - consciously
or not -commencement of FTA negotiations with other Islamic
countries. Egypt is an obvious, commercially significant, and
highly strategic candidate. Its political and cultural influence in
many parts of the Arab world are enormous. Egypt could be the
anchor for a Middle East FTA into which the existing pacts with
Israel and Jordan could be folded. Twenty-six Senators have
101 This history, as well as an explanation of the agreement and the implementing
legislation, is set forth in HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, OVERVIEW AND
COMPILATION OF U.S. TRADE STATUTES, H.R. DOC. NO. 107-4, at 262-64 (2001).
102 See generally, BERNARD HOEKMAN & JAMEL ZARROUK EDS., CATCHING UP WITH
THE COMPETITION (2000) (containing economic essays on regional trade integration in
Middle East); see also BERNARD HOEKMAN & HANAA KHEIR-EL-DIN EDS., TRADE POLICY
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA (2000) (containing economic
essays on trade and investment in Middle East).
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supported these ideas, yet no substantial progress has been made
beyond a "Trade and Investment Framework Agreement"
("TIFA") between the United States and Egypt signed in 1999,103
and an expression of interest by the United States in November
2001 in starting talks. 10 4
103 See Gary G. Yerkey, US., Egypt Agree to Seek "Framework" for Eventual Free
Trade and Investment, 18 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 555 (Apr. 5, 2001) (quoting Zoellick,
"Egypt is one of the most important partners of the United States."); Gary G. Yerkey, U.S.
Senators Urge President Clinton to Negotiate Free-Trade Pact with Egypt, 17 INT'L
TRADE REP. (BNA) 1255 (Aug. 10, 2000) (stating negotiations with Egypt for free-trade
agreement would promote peace in the Middle East).
104 See Gary G. Yerkey, US. Wants FTA Talks with Egypt, Links Trade to Global
War on Terrorism, 18 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1806 (Nov. 8, 2001) (stating U.S. wants to
begin free trade negotiations with Egypt). The USTR has expressed an interest in an
FTA with Egypt, but also said that a large amount of preparatory work would be required
first, not the least of which would be reforms in Egypt (e.g., simplifying customs
procedures, so as to facilitate the movement of merchandise into and out of Egypt, and
liberalizing access to foreign exchange markets, in order to facilitate import purchases).
See Gary G. Yerkey, U.S. Wants Free Trade Pact with Egypt But Says Start of Talks Still
Long Way Off, 19 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1062 (June 13, 2002). Trade between the United
States and Egypt now is valued at $4.2 billion, and the United States is Egypt's largest
trading partner. Egypt has a keen export interest in textiles and clothing, the imports of
which remain subject to quotas until the WTO Agreement on Textiles and Clothingtakes
full effect. Egypt has urged that American businesses could lose market share to EU
competitors, because of an-agreement between the EU and Egypt to reduce tariffs over a
12-year period. See Abeer Allam, Egypt Hopes for Free Trade Pact with U.S., N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 6, 2002, at W1.
The Clinton Administration discussed the idea of an FTA with three Maghreb
countries, Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia (but not Libya), and USTR Zoellick also
mentioned this possibility on his January 2002 trip in Morocco. The United States has a
TIFA with Morocco, and one with Algeria as well (the latter, signed in July 2001, is posted
on the USTR's website at www.ustr.gov). See Gary G. Yerkey, USTR Zoellick Plans
Travel to Africa, Latin America, and Asia in Coming Weeks, 19 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA)
177 (Jan. 31, 2002).
Thusfar, the extent of material progress on turning the idea of an FTA with Morocco
into reality is questionable. Negotiations were launched on 21 January 2003, with the
aim of concluding a deal by the end of 2003. The United States exports about $475
million worth of products to Morocco a year, and the top products are aircraft, corn, and
machinery. The USTR urges that an FTA with Morocco would expand market access
opportunities for American farmers and industrial workers, and that it would support the
process of economic reform in Morocco. Nonetheless, persuading Morocco that its self-
interest lies in reducing its considerable barriers to imports, especially agricultural
products, from the United States may prove difficult. American exports to Morocco face
an average tariff of 20 percent, while Moroccan merchandise entering the United States is
subject to an average 4 percent tariff. Morocco's tariffs on beef and wheat are particularly
high, the latter because of the government's policy to keep the price of bread low. Thus, to
satisfy American commercial interests, a considerable degree of non-reciprocal duty
reductions, with Morocco bearing the heavier responsibility, may be necessary. The
French Foreign Trade Minister, Francois Loos, certainly did not facilitate matters when
he apparently told Morocco "You have to decide to choose" as between an FTA with the
United States and closer trade relations with the EU. (Morocco and the EU entered into
an association agreement in 1995, the aim of which is to provide preferential tariff
treatment for most industrial and some agricultural products by 2012. Presently, France
is Morocco's largest trading partner, and trade with the EU represents two-thirds of all of
Morocco's trade.) See Gary G. Yerkey, U.S. and Morocco Launch Free Trade Talks, With
Agriculture Likely to Be Toughest Issue, 20 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 193 (Jan. 23, 2003).
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LACK OF INCLUSIVENESS IN THE WTO MEMBERSHIP. Of the 144
WTO Member countries, a rough estimate is that only 20 are
Muslim, or about 14 percent of the Membership.105 The Islamic
countries that have not acceded yet to the WTO are Afghanistan,
Algeria, Azerbaijan, Iran, Iraq, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Syria,
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Yemen.1 06 To be sure, it is
important not to stretch this point. It cannot be inferred that
Muslims as people, as distinct from sovereign Islamic states, are
under-represented. The largest Muslim countries in the world -
Indonesia, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Turkey, and Egypt - are
Members, accounting for 207, 135, 128, 64, and 63 million
people, 107 respectively, or nearly 600 million of the 1.2 billion
Finally, Turkey has proposed a preferential trading arrangement with the United
States, but no concrete action appears to have occurred toward realizing this goal. See
Gary G. Yerkey, Turkish Leader Proposes Trade Pact with U.S. to Cut Tariffs, Non-Tariff
Barriers, 19 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 118 (Jan. 24, 2002). Turkey has gone so far as to say
that it would like to join NAFTA, especially if its application to join the EU is
unsuccessful. Traditionally, the United States is said to have been wary of an FTA with
Turkey because of concerns about Turkey's human rights record. See Gary G. Yerkey,
Turkish Leader Tells President Bush Ankara Wants to Join NAFTA if EU Bid Fails, 19
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 2172 (Dec. 19, 2002). Arguably, that concern is inconsistent with
the constructive engagement approach, which (coupled with a realistic appraisal of
America's commercial interests) prevailed with respect to China's accession to the WTO.
That concern also might be somewhat dated, insofar as it does not account for progress in
Turkey. However, as a practical political matter, Turkey's delayed support for the
military campaign in Iraq may well have reduced the likelihood of an FTA between it and
the United States. If so, that would be unfortunate. Arguably, Turkey's delay ought to be
a reason for hastening progress toward this goal. An FTA might well strengthen the bond
between the two countries on a range of matters going beyond strictly trade. (To be sure,
it would not be a guarantee of unconditional support on future military issues, as
illustrated by the positions taken by Mexico and Chile, both of which have FTA deals with
the United States, in the United Nations Security Council on the use of force against
Iraq.)
105 I count as "Islamic" those countries with a Muslim population of 66 percent or
higher. JOHN L. ESPOSITO, THE OXFORD HISTORY OF ISLAM X, Introduction (1999). The
book contains a handy map, "The World of Islam - Distribution of World Population."
Accordingly, the Islamic countries included are: Afghanistan; Albania; Algeria;
Azerbaijan; Bahrain; Bangladesh; Brunei; Egypt; Gambia; Guinea; Indonesia; Iran; Iraq;
Jordan; Kyrgyzstan; Kuwait; Libya; Mali; Mauritania; Morocco; Oman; Pakistan; Qatar;
Saudi Arabia; Syria; Tajikistan; Tunisia; Turkey; Turkmenistan; United Arab Emirates;
Uzbekistan; Yemen.
Admittedly, the threshold of a two-thirds domestic Muslim population may be high. It
results in the exclusion from my calculations of: Bosnia & Herzegovina; Burkina Faso;
Chad; Guinea Bissau; Kazakhstan; Lebanon; Malaysia; Nigeria; and Sierra Leone. In
each of these countries, Muslims account for between 36 and 65 percent of the population.
See id.
106 In July 2001, the WTO General Council accepted the application for membership
from Tajikistan, and established a working party on accession to negotiate membership
terms. See Daniel Pruzin, WTO Accepts Membership Applications from Bahamas,
Tajikistan; Delays on Iran, 18 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1200 (July 26, 2001).
107 See, World Development Indicators 2001, Size of the Economy, THE WORLD BANK,
Table 1.1, at 12-14 (2002) (1999 data).
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Muslims. Tens of millions more Muslims living in non-Muslim
countries like China and India are represented through the
Membership of those countries. The point is that if the count is
by sovereign states, there is reason for concern about
inclusiveness, especially given some of the prominent Islamic
states - such as Iran, Syria, and Saudi Arabia (all discussed
below) - that remain outside the club.
BLOCKAGE OF IRANIAN ACCESSION. The rise to power of a
cautious modernizer in Iran President Mohammad Khatami
bespeaks the influence of Liberal Reformism in that country, and
suggests Iran might be a good candidate for WTO Membership.
That Membership could encourage economic liberalization, and
foster trade linkages that re-integrate it into the community of
peaceful, prosperous nations. Yet, a strategic opportunity is not
how the United States approaches Tehran's interest in the WTO.
(To the contrary, Iran is said to be part of an "axis of evil," along
with Iraq and North Korea.108) To join the WTO, a working party
needs to be established to negotiate terms of accession, and the
General Council (which operates by consensus) must agree to
form the working party.109 Iran applied to join in 1996. The
initial American response was to block the General Council from
even considering formation of a working party.110 In May 2001,
the United States agreed to placement of the issue on the
agenda. But, on the ground it is reviewing the matter internally,
presumably a euphemistic way of stating its suspicion of Iran's
support for terrorism, the United States continues to block
approval of Iran's request to establish a working party.11
Supported by Israel, but opposed by the EU, the United States
formally blocked Iran's application again in February 2002.112
108 See George Bush and the Axis of Evil, ECONOMIST, Feb. 2, 2002, at 13 (describing
President Bush's comments that Iran is one of nations in "axis of evil"); Judy Dempsey,
Europeans Reject Bush "Axis of Evil" Line on Iran, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2002, at 4
(discussing reactions to President Bush's labeling of Iran as part of "axis of evil").
109 See Bhala, supra note 74, at 1471-74 (describing the accession process).
110 See Daniel Pruzin, US. Blocks Iranian WTO Application,- Syia Prevented from
Placement on Agenda, 19 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 36 (Jan. 3, 2002) (stating that the U.S.
blocked Iran's application for membership in 1996).
"I See Guy Dinmore & Frances Williams, Iran Signals WTO Hopes, FIN. TIMES, May
9, 2001, at 9; Daniel Pruzin, supra note 110 (stating that U.S. has continued to withhold
approval of Iran's membership recently).
112 See Frances Williams, Iran's Bid to Join WTO is Blocked by US., FIN. TIMES, Feb.
14, 2002, at 5 (stating that the U.S. and Israel have blocked Iran from entering the WTO
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BLOCKAGE OF SYRIAN AND LIBYAN ACCESSIONS. The rise to
power of a purported modernizer in Syria, President Bashar al-
Assad, may be a hopeful sign of influence of Liberal Reformists in
that country. So, too, may be Syria's indication in October 2001
that it would like to join the WTO. The United States blocked
the General Council from putting on the agenda the question of
formation of an accession working party. It appears to have done
so because of Syria's support for the Arab League boycott of
Israel." 3 The United States has taken the same position on
Libya's request for WTO Membership - blockage, presumably out
of concern for Libya's support for this boycott.]14 In both cases,
the American position is at odds with that of the EU, which
supports the Syrian and Libyan accession moves. Indeed, the EU
is going so far as to negotiate a trade association accord with
Syria, which is part of a grander design to create a Europe -
Mediterranean FTA by 2010.1'5
HESITANCY TOWARD THE PALESTINIANS. The United States has
told the Palestinian Authority that, given tensions with Israel, it
would not be appropriate for the Authority to gain WTO observer
status. 116 That status would be an initial step toward possible
Membership.
No REAL PROGRESS ON SAUDI ACCESSION. It is not clear how
what appears to be a debate in Saudi Arabia about the nature
and pace of economic reform will play out, and in particular
whether Traditional Reformism will triumph.117 The strategic
argument for including Saudi Arabia in the WTO is
encouragement of Liberal Reformists, or at least Neo-Traditional
since it's first application in 1996).
113 See Daniel Pruzin, Syria to Seek WTO Membership; Objections of US., Israel
Expected, 18 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1806 (Nov. 8, 2001) (stating that American
companies are prohibited from complying with foreign boycotts fostered or imposed
against countries friendly to the United States).
114 See Williams, supra note 112 (stating that Washington has privately served notice
that it will continue to block recent requests for WTO membership from Syria and Libya).
1I 5 Id. (stating EU plans to create a Europe-Mediterranean free trade area by 2010).
116 See Pruzin, supra note 113.
117 See Roula Khalaf, A wind of change must rise in Riyadb, says Prince Talal: Once
exiled for his views, he believes the desert kingdom must now adapt, says Roula Kbalaf,
FIN. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2002, at 20 (stating that prince of Saudia Arabia Talal bin Abdelaziz
believes political reform is necessary).
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Reformists, who in turn will protect the oil flowing from one
quarter of the world's proven reserves. 1 8 The Kingdom applied to
join the GATT in July 1993, though little progress was made in
accession negotiations until the birth of the WTO on 1 January
1995.119 Since then, talks have bogged down over the terms. On
the one hand, the United States (and other developed country
WTO Members) wants market access the Saudis appear
unwilling to provide, because of a threat to the birth of infant
industries that might help wean their economy off of its present
dependence on oil, and a fear of an invasion of western culture
embedded in imported goods and services that would undermine
Islamic values. More than just maintenance of an import ban on
alcohol and pork is at stake.1 20 In March 2001, the Saudis
produced a broad "negative list" of industrial and service sectors
that would be off limits to foreign companies: all insurance and
reinsurance businesses; telecommunications (public telecom,
data and message transmission, and business network services);
wholesale trade; retail distribution; auto dealerships and auto
parts outlets; road and air transport (passenger and freight);
audiovisual businesses (film and video production and
distribution, cinemas, radio, and television); printing and
publishing; education; nursing and paramedical services; real
estate commission businesses; and, of course, oil exploration and
production, and pipeline transport.'21 On the other hand, perhaps
the United States is chary of what Saudi Arabia could use: oil
subject to the disciplines of trade law, including bound tariff
schedules, so its exports would not be subject to excessive or
discriminatory import barriers.
LACK OF REPRESENTATION IN THE WTO SECRETARIAT. Of the
118 See Robin Allen, Saudis Blame "Unique Status" for Delays in Joining WTO, FIN.
TIMES, June 14, 2000, at 8 (including statements of Osama El-Faqih, Saudia Arabia's
Commerce Minister).
119 See Frances Williams, Saudis Start Talks on Joining the WTO, FIN. TIMES, May 3,
1996, at 4 (stating that Saudia Arabia hopes to join the WTO).
120 See Daniel Pruzin, U.S., EU Push Saudis to Improve Market Access Offers for
WTO Entry, 17 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1654 (Oct. 26, 2000) (noting that Saudis have
taken offense to efforts by WTO nations to force them to make commitments to import
taboo goods).
121 See Daniel Pruzin, Trade Otficials Express Disappointment with Saudi Foreign
Investment Exclusion List, 18 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 446 (Mar. 15, 2001) (noting WTO
nation's disappointment with the Saudis "negative" list of industries that foreigners
would be prohibited from participating in).
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512.5 actual employees at the WTO Secretariat, few are from
Islamic countries. There are 3 Egyptians, 1 Moroccan, 4
Tunisians, and 2 Turks.122 In other words, representation among
employees in the Secretariat from the Islamic World is about 2
percent. Of course, there may be Muslims from non-Muslim
countries (but that is not easy to ascertain from available
sources), and the point of working for the Secretariat is not to be
a lobbyist for the interests of one's own country. Still, the lack of
nationals in the Secretariat from Indonesia, Pakistan, and
Bangladesh - the world's three largest Islamic countries - is
stunning.
SANCTIONS. It has been suggested America has a sanctions-
based foreign policy,1 23 though former Senator Jesse Helms has
disputed the charge that the United States is sanctions happy.124
What is difficult to deny is that Islamic countries are frequent
targets of America's trade sanctions, particularly those taking
aim at state-sponsored terrorism. 125 For example, in August
2001, President Bush agreed to an extension of the Iran and
Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 ("ILSA"), which otherwise would
have lapsed pursuant to a sunset clause in that legislation, after
both houses of Congress voted for the extension by a veto-proof
margin.126 There is a vigorous and world-wide debate as to the
efficacy of isolating regimes in order to bring about a change in
them, or their behavior, as opposed to constructively engaging
them.127
122 See Overview of the WTO Secretariat, supra note 45; see also Esposito, supra note
105.
123 See, e.g., Richard N. Haas, Sanctioning Madness, 76 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 74 (Nov.-
Dec., 1997) (stating that sanctions are becoming U.S. foreign policy tool of choice). See
generally Raj Bhala, Mrs. WATU Seven Steps to Trade Sanctions Analysis, 20 MICH. J.
INT'L L. 565 (1999) (suggesting a doctrinal framework for the analysis of sanctions
legislation).
124 See Jesse Helms, What Sanctions Epidemic, US. Business' Curious Crusade,
FOREIGN AFFAIRS, February, 1999 (stating that the U.S. has not overused sanctions as a
foreign policy tool).
125 See U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, USITC PUB. 3124, OVERVIEW AND ANALYSIS OF
CURRENT U.S. UNILATERAL ECONOMIC SANCTIONS, 1-8-11 and Table 1-3 at 1-12-13 (Inv.
No. 332-391, Aug. 1998) (listing countries under U.S. sanctions and the reasons for the
sanctions).
126 See Gary G. Yerkey, President Signs Five-Year Extension of ILSA as Businesses
Again Protest, 18 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1276 (Aug. 9, 2001) (stating that President
Bush passed law to extend Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 which was about to run
out). See generally Raj Bhala, Fighting Bad Guys With International Trade Law, 31 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 1, 86-115 (1997) (discussing ILSA).
127 See generally, Bhala, supra note 126, at 116-21 (discussing several of the studies
that analyze the debate).
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Certainly, whether these eight points are "snubs" is a matter
perspective and context. Doubtless American trade officials
would claim to have made greater efforts at inviting into the
family of trading nations the Islamic countries. But, as is the
case with developing countries (discussed in Section II), there is
the problem of perception and reality merging in a fuzzy way. If
one side sees itself being told it is not invited to share in the
opportunities from a liberal trade order, then that is a real
problem the other side ignores at its peril.
Whatever the accuracy of the perception, the Islam Challenge
is critical. Failure to meet it is a second reason for abjuring the
characterization of Doha as a "success." Extending Secretary
Hull's vision means linking (1) the integration into the trading
system of Liberal Reformist, and possibly also Neo-Traditional
Reformist, Islamic countries, with (2) the peace and security
necessary for that system to operate. That link is not yet a
feature of American trade law as it relates to the Islamic World.
CONCLUSION
European Commission President Romano Prodi declared the
DDA indicated the new negotiating round "would not be one
world against another but a shared agreement."128 Is he right?
Two Challenges, Poverty and Islam, reflect two great schisms in
global trade - between rich and poor, and Muslim and non-
Muslim.129 If trade law is to liberalize trade, and not be the tool
for protectionist abuse, then these schisms must be narrowed. If
they are not narrowed, then surely Prodi will be wrong.
To say the dominant trading power must take the lead is not to
take a position hostile to American trade law. If the argument
were that American trade policy is a study in failure, then there
would be a legitimate counter-attack. That argument would
make matters sound far worse than they are. But, if the
argument is trade law has not met the two Challenges, which it
is, then it might be taken in the spirit in which it is meant -
constructive criticism.
128 Jonquieres, WTO Agrees to Launch New Trade Talks, supra note 3.
129 For another treatment of developing country issues and the DDA, and the
associated politics of trade liberalization in the United States and Canada, see Alan S.
Alexandroff, Doha: A Very Small Step for Trade Liberalization (2002), available on the
website of the C.D. Howe Institute, www.cdhowe.org (last visited Mar. 5, 2003).
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Empathy is not agreement. Not every point put forward by
every official from a developing or Islamic country about how
trade law ought to be changed is correct. There is rhetoric, even
whining unmindful of self-inflicted wounds like domestic
corruption. More apologies for the Third World are unnecessary.
Is it not a fact that of the 24 poorest African countries that made
economic reforms between 1990-99, 10 of them endured wars and
coups, 3 0 while bureaucracy, graft, and dreaded diseases plagued
virtually all of them? There is blame to go around, but pointing
fingers is not the hallmark of good lawyers. Rather, empathy is
the indispensable quality for effective advocacy in any forum.
The WTO is no exception.
Likewise, humility is needed to avoid overstatement. It would
be excessive to imply that had the United States met successfully
the Poverty and Islam Challenges, all or virtually all of the
outstanding substantive trade law issues would have been
resolved at Doha. Who can gainsay that there were, and still are,
other obstacles in the way? Many WTO Members face domestic
constituency pressures, coupled with internal government
constraints, which conspire against dramatic agreement to new
multilateral trade agreements. In the United States, the
confederates - sometimes in concert, sometimes not - include
many labor unions, environmental lobbyists, human rights
groups (including activists for religious freedom), and consumer
advocates. Not all of the arguments from these non-
governmental actors can be dismissed as simplistic or selfish.
And, of course, there are serious threats posed by unresolved
disputes among the major trading powers (e.g., the Foreign Sales
Corporation case, and numerous AD and safeguards cases131).
Rather, the point in challenging the conventional wisdom
about Doha is that had the two Challenges been addressed, then
Doha might well have produced agreements on more substantive
points than it did. Indeed, insofar as overlap exists between
concerns raised by NGOs, or parts of governments, in some WTO
Members, and concerns of developing and Islamic countries,
130 See Not By Their Bootstraps Alone, ECONOMIST, May 12, 2001, at 52
(hypothesizing that not giving the poor countries support during the transition to
liberalization can be a recipe for economic instability).
131 For a discussion of these cases, see Raj Bhala & David Gantz, WTO Case Review
2000, 18 ARIZONA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1 (2001) and Raj Bhala & David Gantz, WTO Case
Review 2001, 19 ARIZONA J. INT'L & COMP. L. (2002).
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there is reason for confidence in this historical counter-factual
claim. However, that intriguing overlap is for another article.
